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R,:evenue Sharing in Major
League Baseball:
Are Cuba's Political Managers
on Their Way over Too?
[By Matthew Ryan McCarthy* ]
T he close of the 2001 Major League
Baseball ("MLB") season marked
the end of a dramatic era, both
for the sport and the nation.
Louis Gonzalez's ninth inning
single drove in the winning run,
closing the 2001 World Series be-
tween the New York Yankees and the nascent
Arizona Diamondbacks, who were an expan-
ery cap following the tragic events of Sep-
tember 11, 2001. 4 The patch honored the
memory of the victims and heroes who died
in the attacks.' Moreover, the flag also rep-
resented the ideals and principles of a nation
threatened by terrorist forces on that tragic
day.6 "[The Flag is] a symbol of a living thing
... [a] 225-year experiment in liberty and the
people, the values and institutions that have
"The smaller market teams claim that
they cannot compete because they
have less revenue than the bigger
teams, and less revenue translates to
an inability to pay for high priced
players and state-of-the-art facilities.
sion team only four years earlier.1 The 2001
World Series was notable for many reasons,
including the fact that 2001 was the last time
the American flag adorned the uniform of
major league ballplayers.2 The flag's brief ap-
pearance only lasted for the balance of the
baseball season marred by the tragic events
of the terrorist attacks.3
Old Glory appeared as a patch on the
back of every uniform and on the side of ev-
... made it work."7 The disappearance of this
important symbol of American ideology from
the players' uniforms eerily coincides with a
rising threat to the economic ideals and prin-
ciples that govern our national pastime-a
threat greater than the designated hitter,
Astroturf, or inter-league play.
SPORTS
L Introduction
In response to a growing disparity
amongst the league's best and worst teams, fans,
reporters, and even some players have pro-
posed various plans designed to share revenues
amongst owners and level the economic play-
ing field.8 The smaller market teams claim they
cannot compete because they have less revenue
than the bigger teams, which translates to an
inability to pay for high priced players and
state-of-the-art facilities.9 In response to this
perceived problem, owners have proposed and
implemented some limited forms of revenue
sharing and a competitive balance tax.10 The
competitive balance tax collects revenue from
MLB's wealthiest teams and redistributes it
evenly to poorer teams in smaller markets for
their expenses and development." Owners
remain free to either reinvest the money re-
ceived from the competitive balance tax in the
team and stadium or to pocket the money as
profit.12 As such, the redistribution may not
have the desired effect on competition, if it has
any effect at all.' 3 In addition, there are a num-
ber of antitrust issues to consider under any
proposed expansion of the competitive balance
tax or other form of revenue sharing plan agreed
to by players and owners in a MLB Collective
Bargaining Agreement ("CBA").
Part II of this Note examines the history
of professional baseball's exemption from tra-
ditional antitrust regulations and the struggle
between the players and owners to reach labor
agreements that encourage competition among
teams and fairly compensates players. It de-
tails the history of the various CBAs between
players and owners and considers what rem-
edy owners opposed to sharing revenue might
have in federal court against revenue sharing
plans implemented through a CBA.
Part III analyzes the current controversy
over the level of competition in MLB. It criti-
cizes the owners' solutions and examines the
difficulties these solutions faced. Finally, Part
IV proposes that MLB should encourage parity
in the traditional way: the free market. The
league should create incentives to return own-
ership of every team's minor league teams to
the owners of the big club. In the alternative, if
MLB implements another revenue sharing plan,
free of antitrust concerns, shared funds should
match the degree of investment an owner is
willing to make into a team. Finally, MLB
should expand the postseason, allowing six
teams from each league to reach the playoffs
and adding a first round bye for the top two
teams from each league.
II. Labor, Management, and the
Collective Bargaining Agreement
A. Baseball's Antitrust Ex-
emption: A Fragile House of Cards
Beginning next season, the Montreal
Expos will no longer play in Montreal. 14 Ateam
that was on the verge of extinction just a few
years ago 15 is hoping to start a new life in Wash-
ington.16 Team relocation and contraction are
issues beyond the scope of this Note, but the
Expos' exodus from Montreal for greener pas-
tures is illustrative of MLB's control over the
market for professional baseball. The federal
courts and federal legislature created MLB's
market and the thriving cartel of MLB owners
that oversees it. The twenty-nine major league
owners' ability to collectively purchase one of
their existing competitors and relocate the team
from its home stems from MLB's operation
outside traditional federal and state antitrust
law. Essentially, MLB's antitrust exemption al-
lows cooperation and collusion amongst its
owner members.
7
Traditionally, "[e]very contract combi-
nation in form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce.. .is... declared to be illegal." 8 Con-
gress passed the Antitrust Act of July 2, 1890
("Sherman Antitrust Act") 19 to stem a tide of
unfair cooperation amongst trusts formed in
industries such as oil, steel, and the railroads,
and to encourage fair trade through competi-
tion in the free market. 20 Since the passage of
the Sherman Antitrust Act, the predominant
form of antitrust enforcement against busi-
nesses that harm others through price fixing,
and other forms of anticompetitive cooperation,
has been the private antitrust suit.2' The United
States Supreme Court and Congress have taken
steps to exempt professional baseball from the
reach of private antitrust suits. 22 This anomaly
in antitrust regulation is the result of Congres-
sional inaction, the effect of which is the pres-
ervation of three United States Supreme Court
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decisions that considered antitrust challenges
to professional baseball's operations creating the
exemption.
Professional baseball's infamous anti-
trust trilogy 23 begins with Federal Baseball Club
v. National League, which considered a treble
damages suit filed by the Federal Baseball Club
alleging antitrust violations.24 In Federal Base-
ball Club, the plaintiff alleged unfair coopera-
tion amongst the individual clubs in the Na-
tional and American Leagues to share gate re-
ceipts and establish a monopoly through inter-
state commerce, which was an alleged viola-
tion of federal antitrust law.25 Justice Holmes,
writing for the majority, opined that profes-
sional baseball is immune from federal antitrust
regulations.26 He reasoned that the federal law
did not apply to the baseball teams, and held
that players playing games for their respective
teams outside their home states is not unlike a
firm of lawyers sending attorneys outside its
The final case in baseball's infamous antitrust
trilogy, Flood v. Kuhn,31 involved a challenge of
professional baseball's reserve system.3 2 The
Supreme Court reaffirmed baseball's exemp-
tion from federal and state antitrust law.33 The
Supreme Court's decision relied upon the opin-
ions of Federal Baseball Club and Toolson, tak-
ing judicial notice of Congress' acquiescence to
the Court's rulings by its silence on the subject,
and an explicit Congressional refusal to extend
baseball's exemption to other organized profes-
sional sports. 4 The Flood Court observed, "the
orderly way to eliminate error or discrimina-
tion [from the existing exemption], if any there
be, is by legislation and not by court decision."
3 5
Congress finally took action to limit the
scope of baseball's antitrust exemption when it
passed the 1998 Curt Flood Act.36 Although it
was a dramatic step, the legislative effect of the
Curt Flood Act was not a complete repeal of
baseball's exemption.3 1 Instead, the Curt Flood
r "The federal courts and federallegislatur  created MLB's market,
L and the thriving cartel of MLB
owners that oversees it."
home state's boundaries to argue a case, or a
lecturer traveling the lecture circuit, and thus
not interstate commerce.27
The Supreme Court confronted the
question of professional baseball and antitrust
again in 1953 in Toolson v. New York Yankees,
Inc. when it considered allegations that profes-
sional baseball deprived the plaintiff of his live-
lihood through unfair cooperation.28 In
Toolson, the plaintiff alleged that the league
"blacklisted" him and essentially barred him
from playing on other teams.29 The Toolson
Court, based chiefly upon the precedent in Jus-
tice Holmes' opinion in Federal Baseball Club,
held that professional baseball was exempt
from the ordinary reaches of federal or state
antitrust law, and denied the plaintiff's claim. 0
Act was a rather small strike against it, remov-
ing labor agreements between players and own-
ers from coverage by baseball's infamous anti-
trust exemption. 8 Arguably, the Curt Flood
Act may cause a long-standing exemption for
MLB from federal and state antitrust challenges
to come tumbling down. The exemption has
been the subject of numerous legal challenges,
all seeking a similar exemption.3 9 So far, the
delicate house of cards that protects MLB's op-
erations from antitrust attacks in federal court
remains intact and unique to baseball.
B. The Future of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement in the Wake
of the 1998 Curt Flood Act
To date, neither Congress nor the Su-
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice
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preme Court is willing to change the status quo.
In the future, however, it is possible that law-
suits challenging MLB labor agreements
reached through collective bargaining will be
vulnerable to antitrust litigation. This is true
because of the Sherman Antitrust Act's unde-
sirable effect on organized labor.40 In Loewe v.
Lawlor, the Supreme Court determined that
cooperation amongst unionized laborers vio-
lated the Sherman Antitrust Act as an illegal
restraint of trade;41 this is a decision in conflict
with legislation aimed at reducing unfair com-
petition that gave industry a stranglehold over
its customers and laborers.
Congress responded to the Court's in-
terpretation of its oversight by passing legisla-
tion to specifically remove organized labor from
coverage by the Sherman Antitrust Act and in-
stituting a federal policy favoring organized la-
bor.42 In addition, Congress passed the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") in 1953, which
established a federal policy that favored a col-
lective bargaining process between labor and
management. 43 Shortly thereafter, the NLRA
established the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") to review questions on whether la-
bor-management issues fell under the collec-
tive bargaining laws of the NLRA.44 Although
MLB labor agreements were only recently for-
mally exempted from antitrust challenges in
state and federal courts, 45 a ruling by the NLRB
in 1969, holding that baseball falls under inter-
state commerce and is subject to the provisions
of the NLRA,46 paved the way for the modern
collective bargaining process between players
and MLB owners.
1. Baseball's Labor Woes:
A History of its CBAs and
the ML PA
The most recent labor agreement be-
tween players and MLB owners was the first
CBA reached without a work stoppage.47 By
avoiding another devastating players' strike like
the one in 1994, which caused the World Se-
ries to be cancelled for the first time in history,
48 the most recent CBA came at a relatively low
cost to all concerned. Arguably, a CBA reached
without a strike or lockout has taken this long
to come about because of professional baseball's
exemption from antitrust litigation. The 1969
NLRB ruling that baseball is interstate com-
merce and subject to the provisions of the
NLRA allowed the players to organize and
strike.49 Initially the players organized simply
as a creature of convenience to communicate
their grievances to owners.50 Eventually this
fledgling organization of players became the
MLB Players' Association ("MLBPA"), 51 an or-
ganization that has grown stronger over time.
The MLBPA's transformation from a
creature of convenience to a real players' union
began in 1966 with the hiring of a new execu-
tive director, Marvin Miller.52 Miller encour-
aged players to flex their combined muscle
against owners who were unwilling to make
concessions to their demands. Miller's hiring,
which coincided with the seminal 1969 NLRB
ruling, allowed the MLBPA to take advantage
of the players' basic labor rights under the
NLRA, which included a right to self-organiza-
tion, a right to bargain collectively through cho-
sen representatives, and a right to participate
in concerted activities against MLB owners.
53
The 1973 CBA, which was reached
shortly after Miller's installment as executive
director, was a major victory for the MLBPA
over the MLB owners.54 The 1973 CBA limited
the effects of the reserve system and allowed
players to submit salary disputes to an inde-
pendent arbitrator.55 Baseball's reserve system
did not disappear because of an antitrust suit,
such as the one against MLB in 1972.56 In other
industries, consumers harmed by price fixing
may levy private antitrust suits against owners
engaged in similar unfair cooperative prac-
tices.5 7 Baseball avoids such private suits be-
cause of its antitrust exemption. The reserve
system allowed owners to unilaterally renego-
tiate an individual player's contract at the
player's existing salary if there was not a new
contract in place before the commencement of
the following season.5 1 It prevented players
from holding out for more money by becom-
ing free agents, essentially foreclosing a player's
ability to profit from superior play on the field.
Limiting MLB owners' unilateral control over
players' salaries and movement was a major
victory for Miller and the MLBPA in 1973.
The reserve clause disappeared in 1976,
following another work stoppage and a hard-
fought CBA.59 Building off the success of the
1973 agreement and the bargaining strength
of Miller and the MLBPA, the players gained
Summer 2005
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the ability to become free agents following six
years of play under their original contracts.
60
The owners conceded to raise the minimum
player salaries and increased pensions; however,
the owners also used a seventeen day lockout
during the talks to force the players' hand.
61
The necessity of a lockout in 1976 and the re-
sulting CBA were both indicative of MLB own-
ers losing ground to the MLBPA.
6 2
The final blow to the reserve system
came in 1976 in a court challenge by two play-
ers upset with their treatment from their former
teams. In Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v.
MLBPA, the Eighth Circuit considered griev-
ances filed by the MLBPA on behalf of Andy
Messersmith and Dave McNally (two MLB
pitchers), alleging that MLB owners denied
them their rights to deal with other teams for
their services after their year on reserve. 63 The
MLBPA requested that the owners be ordered
to treat these players as free agents and to com-
pensate them for any financial detriment in-
curred due to their delay in doing so, as previ-
ously directed to under the 1973 CBA. 64 The
Kansas City court held that the players were free
agents.65 Further, the Kansas City court held
that, while players and owners agreed that there
is a year reserved for an owners' renewal, the
agreement did not allow owners to force a player
into a perpetual agreement to play for their re-
spective clubs at the existing contract rate.66
The 1981 strike was more severe than
that the MLBPA had gained a significant foot-
hold against the powerful cartel of MLB own-
ers.68 The 1981 agreement included a new
method for compensating major league clubs
that lost players to free agency.69 In essence,
players were divided into two pools, a pool of
"A" players and a pool of "B" players, depend-
ing upon their performance during the previ-
ous two years. A team losing an "A" player re-
ceived an extra player in the subsequent year's
amateur draft, as well as a player from the com-
pensation pool of players.7 Teams losing a "B"
player received two extra selections in the next
year's amateur draft. 1 In 1981, MLB owners
aimed the pooling plan for compensating teams
at improving the level of competitiveness
amongst the various MLB clubs.72 The goal of
the 1981 strike was to improve the balance of
bargaining strength between players and own-
ers.
In 1985, players and owners were once
again at odds, this time over a proposed salary
cap and revenue sharing plan, both of which
were attempted to limit salary growth.73 An
MLBPA strike that lasted two days forced the
salary cap off the table.74 In return for limiting
a player's opportunity to seek independent sal-
ary arbitration after three years of his existing
contract, the owners conceded the salary cap,
but agreed to an increase in the players' mini-
mum salary requirements and granted players
a portion of revenue profits.75 Unfortunately,
"The reserve system allowed owners
to unilaterally renegotiate an individual
player's contract at the player's
existing salary if there was not a new
contract in place before the com-
mencement of the following season.
the 1976 lockout since it lasted fifty days and
cost the league a considerable amount of rev-
enue. 67 While each side would argue that it
gained from the resulting CBA, it seems clear
to most commentators that the 1981 work stop-
page sent unambiguous signals to the industry
this was not the end of the labor trouble for
players or owners. In response to the CBA, MLB
owners colluded and agreed that no club would
hire free agents in 1985, forcing players to re-
main with their current teams and effectively
disrupting any individual player's bargaining
559 Vanderbilt journal of Entertainment Law & Practice
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position.76 The MLBPA took its grievances be-
fore an independent arbitrator,77 stating that the
owners had conspired against the players and
were implementing unfair labor practices in
conflict with the provisions of the NLRA. The
arbitrator sided with the players and awarded
$280 million in damages. 8
In 1990 came another lockout, this time
lasting thirty-two days.79 Owners proposed a
massive restructuring of the expiring CBA,
seeking revenue sharing amongst clubs and a
salary cap. 0 The players and owners success-
fully negotiated a new CBA, leaving revenue
sharing and the imposition of a salary cap on
the table, and pushing the start of the
postseason back in order to appease television
networks suffering from the rescheduling of the
seventy-eight missed games.81 The players con-
ceded, however, that after three years, talks
would resume regarding free agency, arbitra-
tion, and minimum salaries.82 Arguably, by





leaving the door open during these talks, the
players set the stage for the devastating 1994
players' strike.
In 1994, there was no World Series
champion for the first time in the history of
MLB.83 During the 1993 and 1994 MLB sea-
sons, MLB owners took an opportunity to walk
through the door left open by players in 1990,
and reopened discussions with players concern-
ing issues of free agency, salary arbitration, and
minimum salary.8 4 Despite efforts by both sides
to reach an agreement, the 1990 CBA expired
on December 31, 1993, and a players' strike
began on August 12 of the following year that
ended any hope of a World Series.8 5 Prior to
the 1994 strike, the owners had proposed to
share incoming revenues with players on an
equal basis, a reduction from the players' then
existing share (closer to 56%), while phasing in
a salary cap and eliminating salary arbitration.
8 6
Donald Fehr, the new MLBPA executive
director, estimated the costs of the owners' pro-
posal to the players to be around $1.5 billion
over the life of the proposed CBA1 7 Accord-
ingly, the MLBPA relied on its perceived bar-
gaining position, rejected the owners' proposal,
and elected to strike.88 Some commentators
observed that the 1994 strike was the result of
the bargaining structure between players and
owners, changing from one of paternalism to
more of an adversarial system.89 The end re-
sult of the 1994 players' strike was appalling to
fans and disastrous to professional baseball, but
the 1998 baseball season, which was filled with
historic achievements and broken records,
somewhat renewed fan interest in the game.90
Although the 1998 season may have renewed
interest in the game for some fans, the relation-
ke was the result
ning structure
rs and owners,
ie of paternalism 
I
system."
ship between players and owners has been
slower to recover.
The 1996 CBA included concessions
from both sides and a peaceful settlement after
a disruptive break in the baseball action in
1994.91 The players received an increase in their
minimum salaries, as well as a time-in-service
credit for the seventy-five playing days they
missed during the strike in 1994.92 The 1996
CBA also saw the birth of the competitive bal-
ance tax, which is the present version of rev-
enue sharing in MLB.9 3 Under the current
structure, the five teams with the biggest ag-
gregate payrolls pay the competitive balance
tax.94 MLB pools the revenues from these
sources and divides them among smaller rev-
enue and payroll teams. 95 Presumably, the tax
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helps smaller revenue clubs compete and cor-
rects an environment currently favoring player
mobility amongst the leagues varied clubs.96
On September 9, 2002, MLB reached
its most recent CBA between players and own-
ers, with the owners voting 29-1 in favor of the
CBA's final provisions.97 Not surprisingly, the
Yankees were the lone holdout.9 8 The parties
reached an agreement for the first time in his-
tory without resulting in either a strike or lock-
out.99 Avoiding a work stoppage is indicative
of improving relations between the two fac-
tions; however, the agreement currently in place
may have left some owners feeling unsatisfied."°0
The 2002 CBA, other than a few minor
modifications, generally leaves the 1996 agree-
ment intact. The league's newest agreement did
not change the language governing salary arbi-
tration.10 1 MLB owners increased players' mini-
mum salaries, tabled contraction until the end
of the present four-year agreement, and in-
cluded provisions to discuss a worldwide draft
and drug testing for "Schedule III" anabolic
androgenic steroids through the agreement.
1 2
The most dramatic changes to the 1996
CBA agreement were those made in the areas
of revenue sharing and the competitive balance
tax. There is a growing trend in MLB to share
revenues and penalize wealthy teams, which
introduces a strong form of socialism into MLB.
Specifically, the 2002 CBA calls for the disburse-
ment of $175 billion to the teams, or $258 mil-
lion per team, phased in over four years on a
straight pooling basis.10 3 Over the same four-
year period, the competitive balance tax will
increase in thresholds, above which a team will
pay a penalty to the league, from $117 million
to $136.5 million in 2006.14
The changes made in these areas coin-
cide with the recommendations made in The
Report of the Independent Members of the
Commissioner's Blue Ribbon Panel on Baseball
Economics ("Blue Ribbon Report"), authored by
Richard C. Levin, et al., and completed in July
2000.105 MLB commissioned the Blue Ribbon
Report to study whether revenue disparities
among clubs are seriously damaging to the
competitive balance of MLB, and to recom-
mend structural reforms to ameliorate the prob-
lem.10 6  The Blue Ribbon Report offered sev-
eral suggestions to level the economic playing
field. Specifically, the Blue Ribbon Report rec-
ommended that MLB should develop new ways
to increase revenues, and treat more revenue
as industry revenues, which would force com-
petition that focused on the skill of the players
and the baseball acumen of the team's man-
agement.107
2. Despite the 1998 Curt
Flood Act, a Private Anti-
trust Suit Challenging a
MLB Labor Agreement
Remains Unlikely
The 2002 CBA, which sought greater
competitive balance in MLB, is a threat to the
position of the Yankees and other wealthy teams.
The Yankees, owned by George Steinbrenner,
were the only MLB club to vote against the 2002
CBA.10 This position was likely due to the in-
creases in revenue sharing and the imposition
of a substantial competitive balance tax. In light
of the 1998 Curt Flood Act, an individual
owner, like Steinbrenner, may respond to the
unfavorable effects of the 2002 CBA by filing
an antitrust suit alleging anticompetitive coop-
eration in federal court. The legislative effect
of the 1998 Curt Flood Act was not a repeal of
MLB's antitrust exemption. 10 9 Instead, it re-
moved labor agreements (such as the 2002
CBA) from coverage by baseball's infamous
antitrust exemption, potentially bringing play-
ers and owners into federal court.110
Generally, cooperation and collusion by
labor unions is exempt from the provisions of
antitrust law, such as the Sherman Antitrust
Act. Congress views collective boycotts and
strikes, although they amount to restraints of
trade, as a necessary allowance to limit the
stranglehold management might otherwise
have on its laborers."1 Congress made this clear
by passing the NLRA in 1953, which established
a federal policy that favored a collective bar-
gaining process between labor and manage-
ment. 1 2 If an individual owner or player elects
to file an antitrust suit, however, allegations of
alleged misconduct must not apply to issues
covered by the current MLB CBA. 113 The
Eighth Circuit first considered the implications
of such a challenge from professional football
players in the National Football League ("NFL")
in Mackey v. National Football League. '14 The
players alleged that the so-called "Rozelle Rule"
was "an illegal combination and conspiracy in
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice
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restraint of trade.""15
In Mackey, the Eighth Circuit held that
before a court will consider a suit challenging a
league's action with respect to labor, the plain-
tiff must first demonstrate that the labor policy
in question is outside the scope of the current
CBA.116 Second, the plaintiff must allege that
the labor agreement concerns a mandatory sub-
ject of collective bargaining, and lastly that the
labor agreement was not the result of arm's
length bargaining.
117
An antitrust challenge in federal court
to a MLB labor agreement must conform to the
foregoing requirements. As such, the 2002 CBA
forecloses some of the most controversial issues
from the fight until the CBA's expiration in 2006.
The threat of an antitrust suit may force MLB
owners to reconsider their position on competi-
tive balance in the league and the appropriate
remedy; however, any immediate attack by
MLB players or owners must conform to the
requirements of the federal courts for antitrust
suits affecting labor agreements.
For example, in National Basketball As-
sociation v. Williams,"8 and Brown v. Pro Foot-
ball, Inc.,119 the federal courts required that in-
dividuals levying antitrust challenges do so only
at the appropriate time. 2 0 The Williams and
Brown courts held that they would not hear an
antitrust suit that challenged the provisions of
an expired CBA, even if owners and players
reached an impasse during the ensuing nego-
tiations.'2 ' A further limitation on the players'
ability to file suit is the Eighth Circuit's require-
ment that players and owners not be currently
engaged in the collective bargaining process,
thus requiring the MLBPA to be de-certified
before a suit may be filed.
22
Mounting a legal attack against owners
in MLP and the MLBPA is ill advised in light of
the owners and players who are opposed to any
expansion of MLB revenue sharing and the
imposition of a salary cap. As an alternative to
this difficult road, the remainder of this Note
endeavors to propose a cooperative solution for
fixing baseball's competitive imbalance. The
solution it proposes makes use of the cartel,
which MLB, the federal courts, and Congress
have all created over time. It takes advantage
of MLB's immunity from traditional antitrust
suits and operation immune to most outside
market forces, by creating internal incentives
to foster competition and parity.
III. Analysis: The Delicate Bal-
ancing Act between Players and
Owners Trying to Improve the
Level of Competition in MLB
In 1999, Rick Reilly's weekly Sports Il-
lustrated column suggested in jest that MLB
create a MLB "Junior Varsity League" to prop-
erly account for the fact that "[o]nly four or five
teams have a shot at the World Series ... (and
that,) [b]aseball has become as predictable as a
Havana City Council election." 123 Reilly's
tongue-in-cheek suggestion may not be out of
left field considering the current state of the
game.
A. A Tale of Two Cities: New
York City, Montreal, and the Fail-
ure of Revenue Sharing in MLB
In light of its colored past and ineffec-
tiveness, the league should avoid expanding
revenue sharing in MLB. There is a sizable gap
in the size of MLB teams' incoming revenues
that exists in large part because of the amount
of revenue an individual team earns selling the
rights to broadcast baseball games on television
and radio stations locally.1 24 MLB implemented
revenue sharing to redistribute a small percent-
age of these local revenues more evenly to level
the economic playing field. 25 Some felt that if
revenues were redistributed, poor teams would
have more money to spend and could become
more competitive. 26
The Yankees, for example, owe a large
part of its incoming revenue stream to the sale
of the rights to broadcast games locally in New
York City, the nation's largest television and ra-
dio market.127 At the other end of the spec-
trum, the Expos bring in a very small amount
of revenue from selling rights to broadcast
games in its much smaller local market of
Montreal. 128 The principle differences between
cities such as Montreal and New York are geo-
graphic, demographic, and economic, all of
which guarantee that teams such as the Yan-
kees take in enormous amounts of local rev-
enues from cities such as New York City, while
teams playing in San Francisco, Kansas City,
Minneapolis and Montreal get whatever they
can from considerably smaller populations of
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people and baseball fans.1 29
Some commentators believe that teams
in small markets are less competitive on the
field because there is a smaller pool of potential
fans from which to draw revenue. 130 When one
examines the effect that the sale of local broad-
cast rights has on the gap in revenues, the avail-
able data is difficult to refute.1 31 The Commis-
sion responsible for MLB's Blue Ribbon Report
concluded that a team's local television revenue
was a good predictor of a team's appearances
and success in the MLB postseason.1 32 The sale
of local broadcast rights for regular season base-
ball games is almost exclusively a function of
the local population that advertisers can expect
to reach; however, MLB is most definitely not a
locally produced product. 33 To remedy the
inherent differences, MLB redistributes funds
from teams earning local revenues to poorer
teams.1 34 Thus, a poor team, such as the Expos,
receives funds through revenue sharing.1 35
Teams like the Expos remain free to
the Yankees or Boston Red Sox), more of the
first quartile teams from MLB's Blue Ribbon
Report 140 earned a place in the World Series.
141
At the bottom, however, teams remained
uncompetitive and out of the postseason and
out of the World Series. 142 In Montreal, own-
ers improved their own position by paying
down debt with the revenues pouring in from
around the league, and not spending money
on new players or facilities.
143
The Florida Marlins are the obvious ex-
ception to the rule and best counterargument
to the position that MLB should not expand its
current revenue sharing programs. Much like
their World Series appearance in 2001, the Yan-
kees' most recent turn in the fall classic ended
with the Bronx Bombers on the losing end.144
The Marlins' World Series victory in 2003 is sig-
nificant because the team's payroll ranked 25th
amongst MLB teams, unlike their first cham-
pionship in 1997, when the team's payroll
ranked fifth amongst MLB teams.
1 45
"There is a growing trend in MLB to share
r revenues and penalize wealthy teams,which introduces a strong form of social-
r0L ism into MLB, an economic system that
calls into sharp relief whether Cuba's
political managers are coming over with
foreign players too"
spend their profits on players, parks, and/or
improving the Expos owners' rate of return.1 36
A refusal to reinvest funds in players and facili-
ties leaves wealthy teams and their fans won-
dering why they share revenue if the result re-
mains the same year to year.137 The shared rev-
enue allows owners to pay down outstanding
debts and increase individual owners' rates of
return. 138
Sharing local revenues has failed be-
cause the money has not improved teams' com-
petitiveness or increased attendance.1 39 At best,
the plan only marginally increased parity, and
then only did so at the top of the heap. Argu-
ably, because of more revenue sharing (e.g.,
cropping available revenues of teams such as
The Marlins are the first World Series
Champions from the fourth quartile of MLB.
146
Bud Selig, current MLB Commissioner believes
that revenue sharing is having the intended ef-
fect of increasing parity in MLB, despite own-
ers' tendencies to pay down debt and increase
their return on investment, recently stating
that, "[t]here's no question that the new eco-
nomic system ... is producing parity."147 Oth-
ers feel, however, that the recent success of small
market teams like the Marlins, Minnesota
Twins and Oakland Athletics, all of whom re-
ceive revenue under the revenue sharing plan,
has more to do with a new management style
used by MLB owners and managers.1 48 The
Marlins, Twins, and Athletics are small market
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teams with small payrolls, but they are success-
ful because of a renewed interest in baseball
statistics. 49
Athletics' General Manager Billy Beane
spends the majority of his available revenue on
players who get on base frequently, pouring over
statistics to find such players in other clubs' fire
sales and in amateur drafts.150 By acquiring
undervalued young players and underrated
veteran players, both looking to make fresh
starts and play under lucrative one-year con-
tracts, small market teams such as the Athlet-
ics are successful despite their very small pay-
rolls.
51
Beane and other General Managers that
have adopted Beane's system are beginning to
achieve the standard of competitiveness ex-
because of Marvin Miller's legacy of leadership
and negotiating prowess.'55 Miller revolution-
ized the economic structure of MLB by seri-
ously upsetting the balance of power between
players and owners. 56
The notion of placing a cap on players'
salaries did not originate in MLB.157 The Na-
tional Basketball Association ("NBA") placed
caps on the percentage of revenues that an in-
dividual team could spend on players' salaries
in 1983.18 The league instituted a range of per-
centages for the individual teams to keep their
salary spending within it. 5 9 "The years under
the cap have been the most successful in NBA
history with league revenues, profits and player
salaries skyrocketing." 160 The NFL experienced
similar prosperity under its own salary cap;
r "... teams in small markets are lesscompetitive on the field becauseL there is a smaller pool of potential
fans from which to draw revenue."
pected by most baseball fans. 2 Teams should
therefore seek efficient solutions to their com-
petitive deficiencies, rather than larger amounts
of revenue from those teams already produc-
ing winners . 153 The Marlins' success is due to
efficient management (wise spending of the
revenue received as a reinvestment in under-
valued players), not baseball's attempt to fix the
inequalities that exist by resorting to social-
ism. 154 Thus, the success of teams like the Mar-
lins and Athletics demonstrates that fans should
be waiting for efficient management in the fu-
ture rather than handouts from Commissioner
Selig.
B. The Improbable Salary Cap
Solution andthe Strength of the
MLBPA
Unlike revenue sharing, the owners'
proposed salary cap remains on the negotiat-
ing table and has yet to be implemented, chiefly
however, players in MLB and the National
Hockey League ("NHL") remain resistant to the
institution of a salary cap. 6' The resistance by
MLB players led to a devastating players' strike
in 1994,162 and has left the NHL embroiled in
an owners' lockout in 2004 that threatens the
end of professional hockey in the U.S.
The NBA salary cap, however, remains
imperfect. Much like the revenue sharing plan
implemented by MLB, there are problems.
According to James Quirk and Rodney Fort,
the NBA currently faces difficulties stemming
from innocuous language in the original salary
cap agreement.1 63 The original NBA agreement
allowed a NBA team to match another team's
offer to one of its departing free agents, regard-
less of salary cap restrictions. 164 Allowing NBA
teams a last shot at keeping their free agents
may keep teams together; however, this largely
emaciates the salary cap to the point that it is
non-existent. 165 Thus, the salary cap acts as
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nothing more than an artificial barrier if a team
may exceed its limitations to prevent a star
player from departing their ranks.
166
The MLBPA effectively keeps the salary
cap out of baseball by making concessions to
owners in other areas. For example, the MLBPA
agreed to eliminate the player compensation
picks that first appeared in 1981.167 Although
this was effective in preventing owners from
imposing a salary cap on players, compensa-
tion picks remain a better method for main-
taining and improving competitive balance in
MLB.1 68 The 1981 CBA agreement included a
method for compensating major league clubs
that lost players to free agency.16 9 In 1981, MLB
owners implemented the pooling plan for com-
pensating teams in the hopes of improving par-
ity.170 MLB no longer uses this method of com-
pensation. 
17
The MLBPA conceded to the demands
of owners in 2002 when it signed the most re-
cent CBA.172 Portions of that agreement found
their basis in recommendations of the MLB Blue
Ribbon Report.173 In addition to the request
that the league drop the 1981 compensation
picks, the report requested that baseball alter
eligibility standards for incoming draft picks. 174
The practice of enticing incoming draft picks
to hold out and wait to sign with a high rev-
enue club making its selections in later rounds
or a year or two after the players' original selec-
tions and offering a large signing bonus upset
the competitive balance.175 As such, the rookie
drafts of collegiate players yielded very few good
players to lower revenue clubs; the resulting
draft order of the selections was based upon
available revenue, rather than performance. 176
This is in direct contradiction to the reasons for
having an available talent draft in MLB.'7
To avoid the salary cap, the MLBPA
makes concessions in areas that do not directly
affect the current crop of players or the MLB
players' pension plan. 78 In its infancy, the
MLBPA's main concern was the protection of
the players' pension plan. 79 As in any other
industry, the MLB players' union seeks to pro-
tect the interests of its current members by
erecting barriers to entry, serving the interests
of the whole over those of its individual mem-
bers, and effectively using whatever advantage
available to the union as a whole, even to the
detriment of future members like those enter-
ing in an amateur draft.
In addition to drastic changes to the
draft approved by the MLBPA, the union took
a number of steps to ensure that player mobil-
ity and the competitive balance tax, rather than
the salary cap, induce competition amongst
MLB clubs.180 Although limited today in Kan-
sas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. MLBPA, the
Eighth Circuit held that the players in question
were free agents and entitled to formal salary
arbitration, which formally enabled greater
player mobility through free agency. 8' The
arbitration decision ensured the more direct
passage of incoming revenues to players, rather
than owners' pockets. 8 2 Owners argued that
enabling players to become free agents and in-
creasing player mobility would hurt competi-
tive balance in the league.
83
The owners were wrong.18 4 Lifting the
restrictions on player movement and upsetting
the reserve clause slightly improved the level
of competitive balance. 8 5 The owners are prob-
ably also wrong about the salary cap. There
will be no increased parity if MLB introduces a
cap on the amount of revenues available for
players' salaries. Teams with higher revenue
will still have more revenue, which they can
offer to incoming players, offer to players in
arbitration, and pay penalties imposed by MLB
for violating the salary cap.
C. The Failure of the Competi-
tive Balance Tax
Cooperation and collusion in profes-
sional sports is unavoidable and is the nature
of the beast.8 6 In a memorable episode of the
National Broadcasting Corporation's popular
television show, "The West Wing," Richard
Schiff's character, Toby Zeigler, jokes that people
bother him and, as such, everyone should be
killed,8 7 everyone that is, except for his beloved
New York Knicks and Yankees.1 88 Of course,
keeping the teams around requires keeping the
sporting arenas to play in, people to operate
them, and someone for the teams to play
against, and as such, the Los Angeles Lakers
and Boston Red Sox stay too.
189
Zeigler's rant illustrates the need for
competitors and cooperation in professional
sports. The reality is that sports teams do not
function in a truly free market. 90 Nor are sports
teams successful through the physical elimina-
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tion of their competitors.' 9' Unlike other in-
dustries, where firms strive for dominance in
LiLC .
pushing teams above the competitive balance
tax.2 1 Like the NBA's regime, the tax amounts
itnout
selves as monopolies, sports leagues require
mutual competition and cooperation and the
preservation of healthy competitors to play
against.192 Smaller markets, such as Kansas City,
San Francisco, Oakland, and Anaheim would
not survive the profitability of markets like Los
Angeles, New York or Chicago, leaving the
Dodgers, Yankees, Mets, Cubs, and White Sox
to play against one another.
193
The competitive balance tax first ap-
peared during the 1997 MLB season.194 Its pur-
pose was to increase parity in baseball by hold-
ing down salaries. 95 If teams elect to exceed a
set spending limit on salaries, so the theory goes,
they must pay a tax to the league on the funds
spent in excess of that limit. It is thought that
the tax will discourage such spending and teams
will voluntarily concede to a self-enforcing sal-
ary cap. 196 Secondly, if the league redistributes
funds earned through this tax to poorer, less
competitive teams, the incoming revenue will
likely enable small market teams to spend more
on salaries and increase competitiveness.197
The competitive balance tax failed the
league in both respects. 98 "Free agent salaries
rise for one reason: an owner believes that he/
she will be more profitable by upping the bid
to sign a player than by allowing the individual
to sign for another team ... owners have a pow-
erful incentive to circumvent the rules that con-
strain their profits."'199 Innocuous language was
the cause of the NBA salary cap agreement's
failure to prevent teams from exceeding its strict
limits. 200 Likewise, the incentive to capture and
retain the most qualified talent in baseball keeps
proper incentives to deter exceeding the limit.
The competitive balance tax failed to
induce more parity in baseball for the same rea-
sons that revenue sharing failed, and there is
still resistance to the imposition of a salary
cap.20 2 Owners receiving funds from revenue
sharing and from the competitive balance tax
paid by wealthy clubs spent the money they
received on items other than increasing player
salaries.203 MLB operates as an independent
cartel, free from outside interference from an-
titrust suits or competition from rival baseball
leagues.20 4 The MLB Blue Ribbon Report rec-
ognized this fact and advised the league to use
its operation as a cartel to induce more parity
amongst its various members by increasing rev-
enue sharing and taxing spending above the
current competitive balance levels at even
higher rates.
25
MLB's Blue Ribbon Report recognized
the need for a MLB minimum payroll level.
20 6
To increase parity in MLB, small market teams
receiving funds from revenue sharing and the
competitive balance tax, must spend a mini-
mum amount of their total revenue on players'
salaries in order to be successful against teams
spending much more.2 7 Enforcement of the
current revenue sharing and competitive bal-
ance tax plans without the imposition of a mini-
mum payroll on all MLB teams makes it un-
likely the league will ever see more parity.
20 8
To date, there is no minimum payroll
in MLB and teams are free to allocate any per-
centage of their available funds to players' sala-
ries.29 Owners have incentives to continue cir-
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cumventing the spending limits at the high end,
exceeding the luxury tax and simply paying
more in penalties to increase profitability.21 An
individual owner valuing a players' worth in-
cludes the amount he will have to pay by ex-
ceeding the competitive balance tax.
211
Small market clubs that feel they are
receiving too small an amount from revenue
sharing and the competitive balance tax to be
competitive will continue to expend funds on
anything other than player salaries; therefore,
competition in MLB will remain stagnant.212 It
is unlikely that a wealthy MLB club disap-
pointed with the failure of revenue sharing and
the competitive balance tax to increase parity
in baseball will bring an antitrust suit challeng-
ing the provisions of the 2002 MLB CBA.213 This
is an odd result, despite the fact that teams such
as the Pittsburgh Pirates and Montreal Expos
arguably squander their windfalls, "replacing
quality players with cheaper, inexperienced
players once quality players begin to earn mar-
ket-level salaries." 214 According to Marburger,
the Pirates and Expos act in their own best in-
terests by carrying out just such a failing busi-
ness model on the field, in favor of the positive
effect it has on the books.21 Increasing profit-
ability is the bottom line for any firm, includ-
ing every one of the MLB clubs, and as such,
"[tihe result (is) an increase in the number of
mid-season cost-cutting trades as teams with
losing records jockey to position themselves for
more postseason subsidies."216
Baseball needs a new solution for in-
creasing parity. Smarter management, not rev-
enue sharing, increased parity in MLB. 217 Like-
wise, a salary cap in MLB is unlikely because it
will not have the owners' anticipated effects of
diminished player salaries or increased parity
in postseason play.218 The competitive balance
tax failed because baseball fails to improve low
revenue teams' chances of reaching the
postseason.21 9 The competitive balance tax does
not include safeguards (i.e., in the form of the
minimum payroll) to ensure that the money
reaches its intended destination, increasing the
payrolls of the teams receiving the funds.
220
IV. Solution: Creating New Eco-
nomic Incentives and -Expanding
the Postseason Will Increase Par-
ity among MLB Clubs
MLB should encourage parity via the tra-
ditional way: the free market. It should create
incentives to return ownership of every team's
minor league teams to the owners of the big club.
Generally, minor league franchises serve as
training grounds for major-league players. 221 As
such, clubs either contract with or own four to
six minor league teams, and each minor league
team plays at a separate level of talent and ex-
perience.222 Major league clubs have separate
contracts with each of their affiliates, which es-
sentially create a market for minor league teams'
allegiances to the various big clubs.223 Each mi-
nor league team signs and develops its minor
league players at standard contract rates for its
respective affiliated major league club.224 Base-
ball operates on thin ice, basing much of its busi-
ness model on an antiquated exemption from
antitrust litigation.
The 1998 Curt Flood Act removes labor
agreements from the exemption's coverage.
225
It threatens the relationship between MLB and
the minor leagues. The belief is that the ex-
emption remains intact for the minor
leagues. 226 MLB teams could better develop
talent in their own ranks in a vertically inte-
grated enterprise. Developing new talent is in-
tegral to parity in the league.227 If MLB is thirty
vertically integrated clubs from Rookie ball
through to the major league teams, it can ar-
gue labor agreements with minor league play-
ers should remain exempt from antitrust liti-
gation. Baseball colludes in any number of ar-
eas, because every successful baseball team
needs at least one other healthy competitor, and
greater parity in the league.
228
Under another revenue sharing plan,
shared funds should match the investment an
owner makes in the team. Teams receiving rev-
enue remain resistant to investing more funds
in the size of their payrolls.229 The failures of
teams like the Expos and the Pirates leave many
baseball fans and owners wondering whether
there is any value in a revenue sharing plan
implemented without a league minimum for
payrolls and incentives to put revenue received
back on the field and in the stands.230 Pres-
ently, the league's incentive structure is com-
57 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law & Practice
SPORTS
pletely backwards. 231
Any plan to cooperate and share local
revenues or to tax teams that spend more than
a threshold amount must include the imposi-
tion of a league minimum payroll and economic
incentives for teams that exceed the minimum
payroll. Bringing team payrolls closer together
requires temperance at both ends of the spend-
ing spectrum. High revenue clubs will inevita-
bly exceed any artificial limit created by a com-
petitive balance tax, including the payment of
any penalties imposed by such a tax in a player's
valuation.23 2 If a low revenue club feels that it
cannot be competitive with the funds they re-
ceive, absent a minimum payroll they must
meet, owners will direct the funds elsewhere.
233
Teams that meet and exceed the league
minimum payroll ought to receive larger shares
of available league revenues. In addition, teams
that reach the postseason in years after increas-
ing their payrolls should receive a bonus. The
bonus should be unavailable to those teams
"Baseball opera
basing much of it
on an antiquated
antitrust litigatio
that already exceed the competitive balance tax.
By realigning the current incentives with the
leagues desired results, MLB will observe a
fairer distribution of wealth in the league and
increased parity. If improving a firm's bottom
line requires improving its competitiveness on
the field, it will take the necessary steps to do
both.
Finally, MLB should expand the
postseason, allowing six teams from each league
to reach the playoffs and adding a first round
bye for the top two teams in each league. "Eight
teams, one champion" is the current tagline for
MLB's postseason.234 Before the imposition of
the league championship in 1969, and division
series in 1995, there were no playoffs to speak
of, only the World Series.235 As the leagues ex-
panded, they introduced divisions into MLB's
makeup and allowed each of the four division
winners to take a place in the postseason and
an opportunity to vie for the ultimate prize.
236
The more dramatic change for baseball
was the introduction of a wild card team from
each league.2 37 In the past, baseball expanded
its postseason to give more teams a realistic
chance to reach the World Series and increase
interest in pennant races at the end of the regu-
lar season.238 MLB succeeded. 239 Baseball's
popularity increases over the progression of the
baseball season, and during the evolution of the
postseason, because teams stay in the hunt
longer as there are four spots currently avail-
able in both leagues. 240
It is time for baseball to expand again,
this time allowing twelve teams to reach the
postseason and rewarding the regular season
champions and second place teams in each
league a bye during the first round of the play-




offs. Such a plan would be essentially the same
as the playoff system as that used by the NFL.
241 Neither the MLB postseason or NFL playoffs
is nearly as expansive as the NHL or NBA "sec-
ond seasons." 242  Expanding baseball's
postseason will increase interest in the game and
inspire more teams to compete for a chance to
play in the World Series.243 Coupled with new
incentives to return ownership of minor league
teams to the big clubs, and rewarding teams
committed to making investments in competi-
tiveness will increase parity in MLB and avoid
any further expansion of socialism in the game.
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V. Conclusion: Can Old Glory
Come from Behind and Win?
MLB owners implemented various plans
to share local revenues, to institute a salary cap,
and imposed a competitive balance tax on
wealthy clubs all in hopes of leveling the eco-
nomic playing field.244 All owners remain free,
however, to either reinvest the money received
in the team and stadium or pocket the money as
profit.245 As such, the redistribution does not
have the desired effect on improving parity.246
MLB attempted to improve the level of compe-
tition through collective bargaining. 247 The sug-
gested solutions failed because MLB failed to
enforce spending limits on low revenue clubs
and correctly incentivize teams to perform on
the field.
248
MLB should encourage increased par-
ity in the traditional way: the free market. The
league should create incentives to return own-
ership of every team's minor league teams to
the owners of the big club.249
In the alternative, if MLB implements
another revenue sharing plan, then the shared
funds should match the degree of investment
an owner is willing to make into a team. Fi-
nally, MLB should expand the postseason.
25°
Baseball's failures to improve parity are a real
threat to the popularity and thereby financial
viability of MLB. The failures threaten the in-
troduction of more socialism into the game's
management. MLB needs new incentives.
251
Who knows? If MLB can improve parity while
preserving a more traditional market approach,
one day MLB may bring the American flag back
too.
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